Twin DNA test: Why identical criminals may no longer be safe

BBC   It's well known that identical twins are not totally identical - they can, usually, be told apart, after all. But up to now it has been almost impossible to distinguish their DNA. It's claimed that a new test can do it quickly and affordably, however - and this could help police solve a number of crimes. 

At the end of 2012, six women were raped in Marseille, in the south of France. Evidence, including DNA, led police to not one, but two suspects - identical twins Elwin and Yohan. Their surname was not revealed. When asked to identify the attacker, victims recognised the twins but couldn't say which one had assaulted them. 

Police are struggling to work out which one to prosecute. They have been holding the brothers in custody since February - each twin says he didn't carry out the attacks, but neither is blaming the other.

When the twins were arrested, media reports said tests to determine who to charge with the crimes would be prohibitively expensive, but that looks set to change. Scientists specialising in genomic research at the Eurofins laboratory in Ebersberg, Germany, say they can now help in cases like this.

"The human genome consists of a three-billion-letter code," says Georg Gradl, their next-generation sequencing expert. "If the body is growing, or an embryo is developing, then all the three billion letters have to be copied.

"During this copying process in the body there are 'typos' happening," says Gradl, referring to slight mutations.

In standard DNA tests only a tiny fraction of the code is analysed - enough to differentiate between two average people, but not identical twins.

Gradl and his team took samples from a pair of male twins and looked at the entire three-billion-letter sequence, and they found a few dozen differences in their DNA.

The scientists also tested the son of one of the men, and found he had inherited five of the mutations from his father. Having analysed the results, they are confident that they can now tell any twin from another, and from their children.

[...]

British MPs label case of Schlesinger twins ‘Kafaesque’, ‘a miscarriage of justice’

Jerusalem Post   British Members of Parliament have accused the Austrian judicial system of corruption, and alleged that a conspiracy has taken place, in relation to the case of a UK-born woman who has lost custody of her twin sons in Austria. [...]

Schlesinger, a Jewish woman from Manchester in the UK, married an Austrian man in October 2006 and subsequently moved to Vienna with him.

The marriage quickly broke down and both parents applied for sole custody of the children in 2009. At one stage, Schlesinger’s husband, a doctor, tried to have her committed to a mental institute by bringing paramedics to their home to sedate her, although this attempt failed, and her husband was subsequently evicted from their home by the police for this action.

Nevertheless, a judge in the Austrian family courts awarded the father full custody, despite the recommendations of the social services for the district where the family lived, and despite the previous ruling of an appeal court which had denied the father’s appeal against  an earlier custody award to Beth.

Before the July 2011 ruling, the court heard evidence from police, paramedics and a police psychiatrist all confirming that Schlesinger was mentally stable. However, the judge relied on a report of a court psychologist who wrote that she was mentally ill, although this assessment was subsequently refuted in November 2011 by a court psychiatrist who said that she had never suffered from mental illness in the past or currently.

The family court judge also ignored the demands of the Appeal Court and the Supreme Court ordering new assessments on her children and the father, despite significant developmental problems experienced by them, while the father has to date not been psychiatrically evaluated by the court, despite worrying evidence about his behavior.

Parliamentarians in the UK brought the case to the attention of the House of Commons on Tuesday evening, with MP Graham Stringer describing the case as “Kafkaesque,” and asked that the government take action on the matter.

“What has happened to Beth Schlesinger belies understanding,” said Stringer. “Authorities have taken decisions about her life and her children’s lives which are inexplicable and certainly unjust,” the MP continued [...]

“I don’t usually believe in conspiracies but in this case the decisions that were taken were so strange that one has to suspect that undue influence and conspiracy were taking place,” MP Stringer told the House of Commons.

“Brought to its bare bones, this case is about a violent father who has been violent towards the mother of his children and other members of the family and who has been given custody of two children,” Stringer concluded.[...]

Schools, Yeshivos, and Cell Phone Policies by Rabbi Yair Hoffman

5 Towns Jewish Times   The conversation has probably come up in every household in America. What is the school’s policy regarding cell phones? Some schools require that a student’s cell phone be deposited with the school at the beginning of the day. Others completely forbid cell phones at school. Yet others forbid their use only during class time. Within the New York City public-school system, Chancellor’s Regulation A-412 §V prohibits all electronic devices in school. It is also a violation of the Citywide Standards of Discipline and Intervention Measures (discipline code B05).

How does halachah weigh in here? May a school confiscate a phone from a student? May the school dump the phone in the dreaded “fish tank”? May a principal look at the phone and determine whom the student has been texting in class and act upon this information? May a student possess and use a “decoy phone,” and when caught with a phone in hand after a text, deftly switch the real phone with the decoy phone, or is this a further violation of geneivas da’as—practicing deceit? (Legend has it that one enterprising young lady had six decoy phones taken away, only to have been ultimately caught when the bus driver texted her that he was planning on picking up the entire busload of students early—and she forwarded the information to her fellow students.) Also, what happens if the school principal or teacher confiscates the phone and loses it? Is there financial responsibility on the school’s part?

The Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 245:10) discusses the exact parameters of corporal punishment, saying that a teacher may not use a rod to discipline a student but may only use a small retzuah (strap), so that it not be cruel or excessive. The same idea is cited in Choshen Mishpat (421:13), that if a child is placed under the guidance or supervision of another, that person may invoke disciplinary measures without resorting to a beis din. This idea is first found in the Terumas HaDeshen (#218). It would thus follow that a teacher or school would certainly be permitted to confiscate an item that is disruptive to the student’s education, and particularly when it may affect others.

However, just as there are limitations on the conduct of the teacher in terms of the degree of punishment that may be meted out, it would follow that there are also limitations on what may or may not be taken away (permanently) or destroyed. Modern poskim have ruled that a school may not permanently take away an item from a student, and that their responsibilities vis-à-vis the item in question are equivalent to that of a shomer chinam—an unpaid watchman (see Kisaos l’Beis Dovid, siman 90). Thus a “fish tank” policy may have some serious halachic (and legal) issues.

There may also be limitations on whether the school may search the violator’s phone as well, from both a legal and halachic point of view. Legally, for a public school to search a student’s phone is probably a violation of the Fourth Amendment (see New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 1985). Halachically, it may be a serious problem as well.

Many people might point to the cherem d’Rabbeinu Gershom (Rabbeinu Gershom ben Yehudah, 960–1040) that banned the reading of people’s private letters as the source for a halachic prohibition. There is actually another source as well. The Rama in Shulchan Aruch Choshen Mishpat (154:7) rules that it is forbidden to look through a window inside someone else’s courtyard on account of the damage that one can do to him. It is clear from this ruling that even without the issue of the cherem d’Rabbeinu Gershom on reading the letters of others, there is a right to privacy in halachah as well. [....]

In conclusion, we must realize that even though schools practically stand in the place of parents in regard to educating our children, from a halachic point of view it is not so simple that the school has unlimited authority. The school certainly has the right to confiscate the phone and to punish the student by not giving it back for a while, but it seems clear that the phone must ultimately be returned. Looking at the contents of the phone is also quite problematic from a halachic point of view. Of course, the student should not violate the rules of the school, nor should a decoy phone be used.

Allan Katz Honoring Parents and CPS- collaborative problem solving approach

Parenting by the Book    A frequent question that parents ask me concerning the CPS – collaborative problem solving approach is – are we not  undermining  our authority as parents if the  focus is  on cooperation and not Kibud Av ve'Eim = complying with and respecting the wishes of parents?

I don't think it is our purpose to raise kids who will jump through our hoops, but rather we should ask , what do they need from us , how can meet their basic needs of (a) autonomy = being connected to their inner beings and core values , feeling self –directed, (b) competence ( c) and relatedness = a feeling of belonging and connectedness. In this way we can raise God fearing, compotent , caring and responsible children.

.

The following is a story, an incident - which a Bnei Brak Rabbi and speaker shared with his audience.

 I was sitting on my porch one afternoon , when my neighbor called out to me and said – Reb Dovid -  your son is climbing the very dangerously high tree next to our apartment block. I said -  that's  OK , he has  got my permission. The neighbor thought Reb Dovid was out of his mind – climbing   that  tree  was dangerous!  Reb Dovid then shared with his neighbor the   CPS  dialogue,  he had with his son about climbing the tree.

 A: Empathy + info gathering stage

Dad: ( neutral   language )  I have noticed that you and your friends have been climbing that big tree , what's up ?

Son:  We all love climbing the tree, it is great fun, also there is not so much to do around here.

Dad – reflective listening – I understand it is fun and not much around for you to do -  I  am just worried – here the dad puts his concern on the table and we have  B:  Define the problem stage . You guys are climbing pretty high, sometimes till the 3^rd floor and without any ropes for protection. It is pretty dangerous, one small slip and you understand what will be the result ? I am concerned about your safety.

Invitation stage : I was wondering if we could brain storm a solution together where you could still climb the tree and enjoy it , and still be acceptably safe if something might happen ?

Son: Maybe someone could stand with a rope on the balcony of the 3^rd floor and the boy climbing would be tied to it ?

Dad. I like the idea but I don't think it is realistic. We need a plan that would work all the time, even when you are alone.

Dad: I was wondering if you could still have fun climbing just up to the first floor. I am OK with this.

Son: I hear your concern and I can appreciate the danger, I am willing to give it a try.[...]

Schlesinger twins: BBC NorthWest News 14th January 2014

Chofetz Chaim: Speaking lashon harah when angry at assailant?

This post got started in the comments to a previous post  about lashon harah.

The sefer Chofetz Chaim is widely assumed to be the definitive Shulchan Aruch for knowing the halachic parameters of the prohibition of  lashon harah. The Chofetz Chaim himself was largely responsible for creating single handedly the halachos of lashon harah.  Thus contrary to most other halachos there is no clear development of discussion, analyis and psak over time from Talmud to Rishonim to Achronim. In fact aside from some mention in the Talmud and a sparse listing of 7 halachos in Hilchos De'os of the Rambam , there is no mention in the Tur or Shulchan Aruch. The Chofetz Chaim created a new category of halacha by transforming what was previously viewed as ethical prinicples discussed by Rabbeinu Yonah and other mussar seforim – into clear cut prohibitions. In addition he spent much effort showing that what was commonly presumed to be permitted speech was in fact prohibited (e.g., the heter of speaking before three described in the Talmud and Rishonim is reinterpreted and severely restricted by the Chofetz Chaim so as to be largely irrelevant). In sum, he created many halachos of lashon harah which were previously viewed as ethical values and he restricted previously heterim for speaking lashon harah.

As the Klausenberger Rebbe stated, the Chofetz Chaim viewed lashon harah as a poison gas which under no circumstance can be allowed to escape into the air. Thus he is focused not only in describing lashon harah but he also creates restrictions to minimize the possiblity of even mistakenly speaking lashon harah. In contrast the Shem m'Shmuel presents a more balanced model where not only is speaking lashon harah evil but so is not saying negative things when it is needed (to'eles) to protect others from harm. The view of the Shem m'Shmuel is apparently presumed in the responsa literature dealing with lashon harah because the added restrictions of the Chofetz Chaim are not mentioned. This is also clear from the Pischei Teshuva (O.C. 156) where he notes that the mussar seforim are strongly focused with the prohibition of speaking lashon harah but there is a worse sin – not speaking up to prevent harm to others

The sefer Chofetz Chaim is complicated and not easy to read. It is divided into two major section (lashon harah and rechilus) because he viewed these two prohibitions as being significantly different - even though there is considerable overlap and repetition in their elucidation. Both of these sections  are clarified by his commentary Be'er Mayim Chaim - to which there are also addition notes appended. Within the discussion of the halachos he frequently provides cross references to discussion in other places in the sefer which provide significant modifications and limitations to the original discussion and contributes significantly  to the complexity of the presentation. 

The question I want to address is what exactly is the sefer Chofetz Chaim? To approach this question, I will present a discussion concerning one clear and unambigious case. Is it permitted to speak for to'eles when there is at the same time their is anger or hatred towards the person being talked about? This is a very common situation which can happen when a person has been cheated, beaten up or sexually abused by another person. Does the Chofetz Chaim permit informing people about the abuser - if the victim is also angry?

An examination of the lashon harah section reveals in clall 10 the following words [Chofetz Chaim Foundation Translation]

Clall 10:1  If "someone" saw a person  commit a "crime" \ sin against a fellow Jew, for example, he stole something from him or withheld wages from him or harmed him, whether the victim was aware of it or not aware of it or if he humiliated the victim or caused him anguish or verbally abused him, and this "someone" knows about the incident with certainty and that the stolen object was not returned or that he did not compensate him for the harm he  caused, and that this person did not approach the victim (14) to  apologize and ask forgiveness for his sin. Even if this "someone"  was the only person who was aware of the incident, he is permitted  to tell other people what happened in order to help the victim (to  restore his loss) and to publicy denigrate the evil actions of this  person (in order that people would stay away from him and not  learn and copy his evil behavior). But all this is on condition that  this "someone" adheres to the following seven rules (listed in the  next halacha, clall 10:2).

It is clear from the above text that the permission to speak about an assailant is totally dependent on whether the seven conditions are met and if they are not fulfilled it is not permitted. I want to focus on the 5^th rule that one "may not make his remarks as a result of some prior hatred that he had for this person."

Clall 10:2: These are the seven rules:

1. The speaker must be a first-hand observer  to the incident  and what he is reporting cannot be something he heard from  someone else unless it was later confirmed as being absolutely true ;

2. The speaker must be extremely careful not to immediately  conclude that the incident had to have been a case of theft or  cheating or damages or something comparable. Instead he must  carefully consider the circumstances of the incident and then  decide whether or not the law defines the incident as theft or damages;

3. The speaker must first rebuke the sinner using language  that is gentle and non-confrontational (8). Perhaps this first  approach will be useful and will result in the sinner rectifying  his actions. If the sinner still will not listen to him, then it is  permitted to publicize the sinner's crime and the wrong that he  did to a fellow Jew. (But if this speaker knows that his rebuke  would be useless, with G‑d's help, I will explain what he must  do further on in the 7th halacha of this Kelal);

4. The speaker may not exaggerate the details o(this "crime" \ sin  any more than they actually are;

5. The speaker's remarks can only be made if his intention is to  achieve a useful outcome as we will explain further on in  the 4th halacha of this Kelal. Moreover, the speaker may not  benefit at all, G-d forbid, in discrediting this sinner, nor may he  make his remarks as a result of some prior hatred that he had for  this person;

6. If the speaker is able to achieve a useful outcome by some other  strategy that would circumvent the need to use Lashon Hara  against this sinner, then in any circumstance it is forbidden to  use Lashon Hara:

7. The speaker's remarks may not cause any additional harm  _ (to this sinner) over and beyond the punishment he would  have received had he appeared in court, been convicted by its  judges and punished to the level that the law required. Please  see a definition of these terms further on in the 9th Kelal of the  Laws of Esurei Rechilut (the 5th & 6th halachot) as that is the  appropriate place to explain these details.

The Chofetz Chaim reiterates that all 7 conditions must be fulfilled to permit speaking lashon harah.

Clall 10:5.... Understand clearly that within the context of these seven rules it makes no difference if the victimized Jew (who was robbed or  cheated or humiliated) asked the speaker to disclose the damages or  the shame that was done to him or ifhe did not ask (and the speaker  made the disclosure of his own accord), the disclosure would be  permitted. But if the speaker did not comply with the seven listed  rules, then even if he was asked to make the disclosure it would  not help (19) and the remarks would be forbidden. Even if the  speaker was a relative of the victimized Jew, the remarks would be  forbidden.

We see clearly that the Chofetz Chaim poskens that if a person's motivation is not because of desire to help others – he is not allowed to describe the bad things another has done. Therefore not only if his motivation is because of his anger at the assailant the Chofetz Chaim does not permit speaking and but even if it is anger mixed with a desire to help others.

Another proof that the Chofetz Chaim requires proper motivation to say lashon harah - even when it is beneficial is

In 10:3 the Chofetz Chaim notes
. And all of this is if the speaker is more virtuous than the offender, and does not commit the sins he is observing (and subsequently reporting). But if he (this observer) is a sinner just like him (13) and he suffers from the same sickness, meaning, he commits the same sins as the victim, then this observer is forbidden to publicize the victim's sins. Because this type of person, in publicizing the sins of the victim has no intention to do good and is not motivated by a sense of "Yir ' at Shamayim" \ a fear of Heaven. Instead this person is driven by a passion to be gleeful at the expense of someone else's suffering and degradation. The prophet Hoshea
addressed this mindset when he said (1 :4) "and I have remembered the blood of Yizre.'el shed by the House of Yehu." Even though Yehu was fulfilling Hashem's will to annihilate the monarchy of Achav in the Valley of Yizre'el, and he was complying with the prophet's instructions, and as a reward G-d granted four generations ofYehu and his descendents kingship over the ten tribes of Israel," nevertheless, ultimately the blood he shed in killing the House of
Achav was remembered and counted against him because Yehu himself was a blatant sinner.

Be'er Mayim Chayim

(KIO/3/1)-(13) 00 ifhe is a sinner just like him: This is a quote from Rabbeinu Yonah in the 3rd sha'ar of Shaare Teshuvah at the end of section #219. Even though he wrote this law in the context of someone who is outside the category of "your brother" because of the many sins committed between himself and G-d, it is obvious that this same rule also applies here in this subject. Rabbeinu Yonah writes that this person's remarks are forbidden because his entire motivation was to rejoice at someone else's pain and degradation. We have already explained this above at the end of the 10th notation specifically from the words of Rabbeinu Yonah, that
even in matters of interpersonal "crimes" if the speaker's motivation is to rejoice at someone else's suffering, then the remarks arc forbidden. 

Concerning the issue of being motivated by anger, the Chofetz Chaim notes in his discussion of rechilus that there is a major dispute between the Taz and the Sma whether one can defend another person by hitting the assailant when your motivation is from anger. The Sma say you can not while the Taz says it is obvious when helping another it doesn't matter what the motivation is. The Chofetz Chaim concludes that there is a dispute regarding hitting but for lashon harah even the Taz would agree that you can't speak lashon harah to benefit others if you do it from anger. He notes that is because it prevents the fullfilment of the conditions - in particular the sin will be exaggerated when the speaker is angry.

(ספר באר מים חיים - הלכות רכילות - כלל ט
(כח)

[הגה"ה - ודע דמה שכתבתי בפנים שלא יחסרו הפרטים הנ"ל, לכאורה הפרט הג', והוא שלא יעשה זה הדבר מצד שנאה, לא שייך רק לדברי הסמ"ע בח"מ בסי' תכ"א סקכ"ח, ע"ש שכתב דהיכא שהוא מצד שנאה אין נפטר במה שהוא מציל עי"ז את חברו, אבל לדברי הט"ז שם בד"ה כדי, שכתב כיון דהוא עושה מצוה בזה אין נפקא מינה בכונתו, לכאורה לא שייך הפרט הזה. אולם באמת כד דייקת גם הט"ז מודה דצריך כאן גם הפרט הזה, דאם יעשה הדבר מצד שנאה לא יושלמו גם שאר הפרטים, דבודאי יחשוב הדבר תיכף לענין רע ויגדיל העולה, ולא יסתכל גם כן אם יצא על ידי סיפורו יותר מכפי הדין, משא"כ בענין דמיירי הט"ז שם

However concerning rechilus the Chofetz Chaim does add a leniency that it is enough that the person tries to force himself to do it for benefit. In that case even though he can't remove the anger from his heart it is permitted to speak rechilus because of the need to fulfill the mitzva of not standing idly by the blood of another. Since the Chofetz Chaim states this leniency only in regards to rechilus and not lashon harah - it must be that it only applies to rechilus. Furthermore it is clear that if the person does not try to remove the anger - that it would be forbidden to speak lashon harah - even for beneficial reasons.

רכילות כלל ט' במ"ח ג''

ג) רק לתועלת. ה...ואין כוונתנו בפרט זה, דאם איננו מכוין לתועלת הוא פטור ממילא מלספר מחמת חשש איסור רכילות, דהלא לא תעמוד על דם רעך כתיב, ואף בענין ממון .... אך כונתנו שיכריח את עצמו בעת הסיפור לכוון לתועלת, ולא מצד שנאה, כי על ידי זה יגנדר על עצמו ממילא איסור רכילות.

In sum, the Chofetz Chaim says lashon harah even for helping others is not permitted unless 7 conditions are fulfilled. One of them is that the motivation needs to benefit others and not because be out of anger. (And in 10:3 the person speaker can not have transgressed the same sins as the perpetrator because his motivation would be wrong) If lashon harah - even if it serves a benefit but it is spoken out of anger or motivation other than being helpful - it is forbidden according to the Chofetz Chaim. Furthermore in the responsa literature these seven conditions of the Chofetz Chaim are not mentioned. Rather it says that speaking lashon harah for benefit (to'eles) is permitted. Thus it would seem that the view of the Chofetz Chaim is not accepted for halacha - despite his assertion to the contrary. It seems to serve primarily as mussar regarding desirable goals to strive for - but not whether particular cases are permitted or not.[ see Dr. Benny Brown's essay on the halachicization of mussar.]

 update
Minchas Asher (Vayikra 19:16) is bothered by a similar question. He concludes
see also lashon harah is character issue not issur

We see then that lashon harah is a concern of character and therefore the speaker's intent is critical in determining whether his words constitute lashon harah. With this principle we can understand the rule that whatever is spoken beneficially does not violate the prohibition of lashon harah – as stated by the Chofetz Chaim (Lashon Harah 3:3). In general we know that there are times when Torah prohibitions are set aside e.g., a positive commandment sets aside a negative one and more severe mitzvos displace lesser mitzvos etc. However this is different because lashon harah is not being displaced when the words are said beneficially. As we stated the prohibition of lashon harah is dependent upon whether it is a bad character trait. Therefore whenever the speaker's motivation is for the good and for benefit of his fellow man and not to hurt him – there is absolutely no issur of lashon harah. It is not that is is being displaced – it doesn't exist! If you examine the matter well it is clearly the correct explanation.

Additional support that lashon harah is primarily a prohibition of faulty character comes from the Chofetz Chaim. He writes that the heter to speak lashon harah for benefit only applies if the speaker doesn't intend to debase his fellow man – but if he means to speak negatively then it is prohibited even if is beneficial. He also writes that if he speaks negatively about a sinner and he himself is guilty of that sin – he does not have a heter to speak. These two halachos seem to contradict the principle that negative speech said for benefit is permitted because it isn't lashon harah. Why should it make a difference what the speaker's intent is and whether he is righteous or not? These apparent contraditions are removed if it accepted that the foundation of the prohibition of lashon harah is because of concern for the speaker's character. 

 update

Attitude toward divorce: Contrast the OU spokesman vs UK divorce judge

OU spokesman Rabbi Dr. Eliyahu Safran  Israel National News

In the past, rather than end an unhappy marriage, a couple – two strangers occupying the same house – often lived a lifetime of misery, imposing that misery on their children even as they tried, with uncertain results, to hide their feelings and behavior from their neighbors and friends.

Such an unhappy life is simply unacceptable in most, if not all, of the Orthodox world today.

Notice, at no point have I suggested a reason for the unhappiness of the unsuccessful marriage.  Whether because the husband was an insufficient provider or because of the stress of a difficult child or any other reason is immaterial.  It really does not matter what the reason is for the failure of a marriage.  What matters is only that, despite an honest attempt by at least one of the partners to make a successful marriage and life, the marriage is untenable.

It was not bashert. 

That realization is a hard blow.  Sometimes the truth that a marriage is unsuccessful takes years to become clear.  Other times, it takes nearly no time for either the husband or wife to discover that the marriage will not work.  “Only three days into the marriage, I knew I had made a terrible mistake.” He is “controlling and belittling.”

... It is a wonder that any marriage survives and succeeds! Yet, most do. Some do not. There needn’t be any shame in that.

 ===============================

UK Divorce Judge Sir Paul Coleridge  Daily Mail

How my family (despite the odd pointed silence) taught me that marriage is worth fighting for. ...

Sometimes you’re happy because you feel as if you are winning, at other times you are depressed because things aren’t going your way. But for much of the time, if you are not careful, you are just rather bored. And being bored in today’s ‘Pass the Partner’ society can all too often lead to discontent and ultimately divorce. Anyone who has ever witnessed the goings-on inside today’s family courts will be aware of the consequences. They are a never-ending carnival of human misery. And what makes this ceaseless river of distress all the more tragic is that in many of the cases there seems to be no solid reason for the divorce to be going ahead.

Some people seem to give up on their marriages simply because their partner has not been attentive towards them or variants on that — their spouse devotes too much time to work, playing golf or is simply said not to be investing enough time in the marriage.<

Such ‘justifications’ would never have been a basis for divorce in the Fifties when the stigma attached to marital breakdown was such that divorcees weren’t allowed in the Royal Enclosure at Ascot (a restriction which, ironically, would exclude many of today’s Royal Family).

But today the process of getting a divorce has become so streamlined that it is a simple form-filling exercise, achievable in six weeks and, if all goes smoothly, at a cost of a few hundred pounds.

It is quicker and easier than getting a driving licence. However, the impact can be devastating and long-lasting, not just for the partners and children involved, but for the wider family, local community and society in general.

Unfortunately, the idea that marriage should be the gold standard is regarded as judgmental and is therefore unpopular with many of the middle-class intelligentsia.

How attitudes have changed even in the four decades since Lisa and I met through mutual friends. When we married in 1973, I was a 23-year-old lawyer, a child bridegroom compared to my 25-year-old wife to be, who was then working as a fashion writer. The differences between us went far beyond our dissimilar fields of work.

In those days I was a party-loving extrovert, while Lisa preferred the company of a few close friends.

As you might expect, we had our disagreements, which tended to result in pointed silences rather than the conflagrations favoured by some couples. But over the years our roles and the sources of tension between us have changed.

If anything it’s me who prefers a quiet night in these days, while Lisa has become steadily more outgoing.

But we have learned to work around and adjust to each other as the years have gone by — though there will always be times when things are not going well.

I think part of the point is that we  took the element of public commitment via our wedding vows  seriously.

Standing up in front of your family and friends to publicly commit to another person gives marriage a psychological stability or glue lacking in other relationships.

This is backed up by evidence that is readily available and will be published by The Marriage Foundation on our website.

The evidence I find overwhelming is that married relationships are more stable and the children of such relationships fare better.

The evidence I find overwhelming is that married relationships are more stable and the children of such relationships fare better.

It is fashionable to argue that none  of this matters, that marriage is simply one of many possible templates for a successful relationship.

But examine the background of almost every child in care or the youth justice system and you will discover a broken home.

Children from such backgrounds are, on every measure of success, less likely to achieve their proper potential and, as their life chances ebb away, the wellbeing of our whole society suffers. Even at the most mundane level, it is estimated that the financial cost to the nation of family breakdown exceeds £44 billion a year: greater than the entire defence budget

I believe that such funds could be far better spent on promoting marriage as an ideal, and in teaching people the art of making it last.<

This is what The Marriage Foundation hopes to achieve and its  remit goes far beyond the younger generations.

In recent years there have been increasing numbers of older couples who have decided to break up once their children have left home.

This may seem to be a victim-less trend, but talk to people in their 20s or 30s whose parents have broken up and you will find that it is still extremely emotionally disturbing not just for them but also for the grandchildren.

To these young minds, it reinforces the idea that marriage is something you can pick up and put down as and when it suits you.

And for these older divorcees, the motivation often seems to be the fantasy that out there somewhere the ‘right’ person is waiting for them and they should grab them while they still have a chance.

We have to rid ourselves of this fantasy that we are going to find  the partner who is perfect in every way: emotionally, physically, intellectually — I’m afraid it’s just a dream. The reality is that, if you are prepared to put in the effort, you will find that the right person for you is right there in front of you — or in Lisa’s case, several purposeful steps ahead of you with a guidebook when we are on holiday.

As we have discovered after many years together, our holidays work best with an agreed division of labour. I tend to be the one who decides where we should go while Lisa does all the planning and detailed research.

That plays to both of our strengths and surely that’s what marriage is about — dancing around each other’s differences and making it work, something far less fashionable than divorce, but infinitely worth the slog.

Appreciating others for what they do for us or why they do it?

In our discussion of the Chofetz Chaim, the issue of the importance of motivation versus actions was mentioned in regards to the dispute of the Taz and the Sma. The case is one in which an assailant is hitting his victim.  The only way to stop him is to hit the assailant. Is it permitted to hit the assailant in order to save the victim from a beating? The Sema says that if you typically try to help people than it is permitted to hit the assailant to save the victim. But if typically you don't concern yourself with saving victims then it is not permitted because this time you must be motivated by hatred of the assailant and not because of a desire to help the victim. The Taz says it makes no sense that you can't help someone because your motivation is problematic. He says it is always permitted to hit the assailant when that is the only way to save the victim - and it doesn't matter what your motivation is.

Rav Yitzchok Zilberstein relates the following story. There was a man - Reuven who had developed a strong hatred for Shimon. In addition he also bore a grudge against a certain yeshiva bachur. Out of his hatred he developed a plan to exact revenge on both of them. One day he told the bachur, that there was a very distinguished talmid chachom who had a fine daughter and they were interested in him. The bachur checked out the family and it was truly an impressive family and the girl was highly praised - it was much more than he had ever hoped to aspire to. Of course he said yes. Reuven told him that he had arranged everything and gave him a time to go to Shimon's house.

When he knocked and the door, Shimon opened it and was truly puzzled as to why this young man had come to see his daughter. He knew nothing about it. It soon became obvious that Reuven was behind this and that his sole motivation was to embarrass them both. Shimon being a refined individual tried to spare the young man as much shame as possible and invited him in to talk Torah over coffee and cake. As they talked Shimon became greatly impressed with the young man - not only his Torah knowledge but his middos. He decided that was in fact what he had hoped for his daughter and suggested that the young man in fact go out with his daughter.

The relationship progressed extremely well and a short time later they were engaged. 

When Reuven discovered that his evil design had been thwarted, he decided to hide his disappointment and make the best of it. He went to Shimon, wished him mazel tov and then asked him for the shadchan fees.

Shimon was outraged, but being a true talmid chachom - he told Reuven that they should go speak to Rav Zilberstein to decide what was appropriate - since obviously Reuven had no intention of making a shidduch but only causing shame and embarrasment. But on the other hand he had brought about the shidduch.

Rav Zilberstein concluded that Reuven was obviously not the shadchan and thus did not deserve the fee. "G-d made the shidduch not you." He noted that this was comparable to Bilam going to curse the Jews and ending up blessing them. Bilam is not given credit for the blessing but he had not intent to cause benefit only harm.

According to the Taz, why shouldn't Reuven be paid for what he accomplished?

update: My concern is not choshem mishpat but the mida of hakaros hatov. Do they need to show gratitude to Reuven for what happened. It seems clear from Rav Zilberstein that there is no reason to show gratitude. 
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This is a post I made 10 years ago Avodah - Gratitude towards your enemy?

R' Chaim Shmuelevitz [Sichos Mussar II #42 page 117] in his discussion of gratitude mentions Shemos Rabbah (1:32) Moshe is introduced to his future father in law as "an Egyptian"

 [Soncino translation] "alternative explanation of AN EGYPTIAN: Moses can be compared to one bitten by a lizard, who ran to place his feet in the water. When he put them in the river, he observed that a small  child was drowning; so he stretched out his hand and saved him. Thereupon the child said: =91Had it not been for you, I would already have perished.=92 To which the man replied: =91Not I have saved you, but the lizard who bit me and from which I escaped, he saved you.=92 Thus the daughters of Jethro greeted Moses: ' Thanks for saving us from the hand of the shepherds.=92 Moses replied: =91The Egyptian whom I slew, he delivered you.=92 They therefore said to their father AN EGYPTIAN. meaning that the Egyptian whom this man slew caused him to come to us.  "

R' Chaim says that we learn from this that one has an obligation of hakaras hatov based upon the consequence of the action not the motivation. Therefore even though the snake and the Egyptian had not intended good but rather the opposite - the recipient of benefit is obligated to have gratitude towards that which caused the benefit.

The commentaries on this medrash have a simpler explanation. Moshe and the rescuer of the child were merely noting that they should not be  viewed as the source of the good but rather HaShem through His various agents.

Does anybody else have R' Shmuelevitz's understanding of hakaras hatov? While the Chovas HaLevavos does mention that hakaras hatov is not dependent upon the motivation of the source - but here we are talking about one's enemy. It would follow that we need to have hakaras hatov to Amalek etc for causing us to do tshuva.